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Scientists have increasingly turned to the brain and to neuroscience more generally to
further an understanding of social and emotional judgments and behavior. Yet, many
neuroscientists (certainly not all) do not consider the role of relational context. Moreover,
most have not examined the impact of relational context in a manner that takes advantage
of conceptual and empirical advances in relationship science. Here we emphasize that: (1)
all social behavior takes place, by deﬁnition, within the context of a relationship (even if
that relationship is a new one with a stranger), and (2) relational context shapes not only
social thoughts, feelings, and behaviors, but also some seemingly non-social thoughts,
feelings, and behaviors in profound ways. We deﬁne relational context and suggest that
accounting for it in the design and interpretation of neuroscience research is essential to
the development of a coherent, generalizable neuroscience of social behavior.Wemake our
case in twoways: (a) we describe someexisting neuroscience research in three substantive
areas (perceiving and reacting to others’ emotions, providing help, and receiving help) that
already has documented the powerful impact of relational context. (b) We describe some
other neuroscience research from these same areas that has not taken relational context
into account. Then, using ﬁndings from social and personality psychology, we make a
case that different results almost certainly would have been found had the research been
conducted in a different relational context. We neither attempt to review all evidence that
relational context shapes neuroscience ﬁndings nor to put forward a theoretical analysis
of all the ways relational context ought to shape neuroscience ﬁndings. Our goal is simply
to urge greater and more systematic consideration of relational context in neuroscientiﬁc
research.
Keywords: relational context, attachment styles, relationship histories, relationship types, relationship character,
relationship stages
INTRODUCTION
What makes a thought, feeling, or behavior “social”? A reason-
able criterion is that the thought, feeling, or behavior is social if it
arises from an individual’s interdependence with another person.
In other words, a person’s thoughts, feelings, and/or behaviors
can be considered “social” if they inﬂuence and/or are inﬂuenced
by another person’s thoughts, feelings, and/or behavior. This
deﬁnition highlights an important point: social acts cannot, by
deﬁnition, be understood by focusing on one actor alone; they
must be examined as multi-person processes – processes that are
powerfully shaped by the nature of the interdependence that exists,
or is desired, between persons – or, in other words, by what we
here call relational context.
The study of social behavior using any methodology, includ-
ing neuroscience methodologies, must take relational context
into account. Researchers must consider not only the nature
of the actor him or herself, but also the nature of the person
with whom he or she is interacting, and, crucially, the nature
of the existing (or desired) relationship between them. It is this
last aspect of multi-person processes on which we focus in this
paper.
Whereas large literatures have accumulated in which
researchers explain interpersonal interactions in terms of the
characteristics of the actor (the participant in a research study),
or, alternatively, the characteristics of person with whom he
or she is interacting (the target person), far less frequently do
researchers account for, or attempt to explain behavior in terms
of the characteristics of the relationship between the actor and
the target. These characteristics are, however, patently impor-
tant: many crucial social variables inhere primarily in relational
ties (or perceived relational ties), rather than in individuals or
in targets themselves. Variables such as interpersonal similar-
ity, trust, commitment, empathy, hostility, felt obligation, and
prosocial behaviormake no sense outside the context of a relation-
ship. Moreover, most variability in such contacts occurs between
the different relationships within individuals’ sets of relation-
ships, rather than between individuals themselves. (We hasten
to acknowledge, of course, that chronic differences in peoples
tendencies to feel such things as trust, commitment or empa-
thy, and to elicit them from others do exist. Yet even these
differences are inherently relational in nature, in that they are
best understood as having developed in the context of speciﬁc
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relationships, and then continuing to have their impact in similar
relationships.)
Failing to account for relational context in our research, we
suggest, has consequences beyond simply precluding researchers
from maximizing their knowledge about social behavior. By col-
lectively neglecting relational context as a variable of interest, while
letting it vary across studies, researchers risk producing a confus-
ing literature. Furthermore, by ignoring relational context in their
empirical work, individual researchers risk drawing conclusions
that will have limited generalizability.
Many current theoretical and empirical neuroscience models
of social behavior have been developed largely upon the basis of
research in which the participants are interacting with, or acting in
the presence of, other individuals whom they have not met before
and likely never expect to see again (e.g., Sanfey et al., 2008). These
models may or may not be valid when it comes to predicting the
actions and interactions within the context of established relation-
ships – which are among the most common, and consequential,
actions and interactions people, execute every day. To be fair, a
growing amount of social neuroscience research has been con-
ducted in the context of ongoing relationships. Moreover, some
has involved participants actually interacting with one another as
neuroscientiﬁc measures have been collected. Yet often, even work
such as this is not accompanied with a careful conceptual consid-
eration of the nature of the relational context involved, nor does it
involve intentional, experimental manipulation of relational con-
texts within studies, or even comparison of results collected within
different relational contexts. Conceptual analyses and considera-
tion of relational contexts, as well as studies involving manip-
ulation of relational contexts and comparison of results across
distinct studies that have addressed the same questions in differ-
ing relational contexts, are all necessary to allow the researchers
to determine how relational contexts shape psychological
processes.
In what follows, we make a case for greater consideration of
relational context in neuroscience research. We begin with a brief
overviewof someways inwhich relational context inﬂuences social
behavior.We then illustrate ourpoint – that relational contextmat-
ters for social neuroscience – with empirical examples drawn both
from the social neuroscience and behavioral literatures. Broadly
speaking, we posit that: (a) much neuroscientiﬁc research (and
much behavioral research as well) neglects relational context; (b)
the large behavioral literatures on topics listed above provide
strong evidence that relational context matters, and (c) that neu-
roscientists who have taken relational context into account have
provided uswith additional strong evidence that relational context
matters.
We have chosen to focus primarily on research in three domains
of social behavior to illustrate our points: (a) the expression and
perception of emotion, (b) giving social support, and (c) receiving
social support. In each case, the point we make is simple: rela-
tional context matters. We believe, however, that the importance
of relational context goes far beyond these three domains and that
it is inﬂuential not only with regard to many other social behav-
iors (e.g., attitude formation and change, conformity, prejudice
and stereotyping, etc.), but also with regard to some seemingly
non-social domains as well such as perception (Schnall et al., 2008)
and intelligence (Woolley et al., 2010). We elaborate on the latter
point a bit below.
RELATIONAL CONTEXT
As stated above, all social behaviors are, by deﬁnition, interper-
sonal (as the saying goes, it takes two to tango!”). Anything that
is interpersonal, furthermore, takes place within the context of a
relationship. This is true even if that interaction is between people
whohave nevermet before,will nevermeet again, andwhohave no
acquaintances in common – this is simply one type of relationship
(one that exists between strangers who expect to remain so). This
does not mean that interactions can only occur between two indi-
viduals (they could take place, for example, between an individual
and a group, or between two groups), but rather that they cannot
occur within one person, in isolation. The other person may be
(and typically is) present but need not be; for instance, one can
act in such a manner so as to beneﬁt a person who is not present.
The point remains that the study of social behavior must take into
account not only the actor, but also the person with whom she or
he is interacting, and the nature of the existing, desired or past
relationship between them.
The relationship aspect of this equation is particularly impor-
tant because the nature of the relationship that exists between
people is a key determinant of the norms governing interactions,
how partner behavior will be interpreted, what duties are felt
toward the partner, how much attention will be paid to the part-
ner and the list could go on. Relational context inﬂuences not
only if, when and how people will act socially toward one another,
and how they will respond to that other’s behavior but, impor-
tantly, it also deﬁneswhat counts as“pro-,”“anti-,”or neutral social
behavior.
Consider a simple example: what happens when a beautiful
bouquet of ﬂowers is delivered to a woman’s home? How will she
react? It depends on relational context. If the ﬂowers come from
a suitor to whom she is attracted, and if she has been hoping the
attraction is mutual, acceptance of the ﬂowers and joy will result.
If they come from her spouse of 30 years who has sent ﬂowers
every week for all those years, she will accept the ﬂowers but may
have no emotional reaction. If they come from a suitor who is
nice enough but in whom this woman personally has no inter-
est, reluctance to accept them, distress and perhaps feelings of
guilt may arise. If they come from a person who has been stalking
the woman and against whom she has a protective order, she will
refuse the ﬂowers and feel fear and distress. The point is straight-
forward: behavior, cognition, and emotion depend on relational
context.
Before we can examine how relational context inﬂuences social
behavior in more detail, however, it will be useful to understand
six ways in which relational context can vary.
SIX WAYS IN WHICH RELATIONAL CONTEXT VARIES
When relational context has been noted in recent neuroscientiﬁc
research, it is often referred to in terms of relationship types,
with those types labeled in lay terms. Researchers have examined,
for example, mother–child relationships and romantic relation-
ships (e.g., Ortigue et al., 2010). Relational context certainly can
be deﬁned in lay language, yet that leaves open the questions of
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just how these relationships differ, conceptually, from one another,
whether there is meaningful variation within a group of relation-
ships labeled with the same term, and how relationships given
different names overlap with one another in conceptual ways.
We believe understanding relationships in conceptual terms to
be crucial to the study of social life generally, and to social neuro-
science in particular (Clark et al., in press). We speciﬁcally suggest
that social and affective neuroscience (and, indeed, many areas
of psychology) will beneﬁt by ﬁrst considering six ways in which
relational context varies, and then considering conceptual varia-
tion within each. (Often researchers will be able to capture the
same conceptual variation in different methodological ways if
they explicitly consider all six ways in which relational context
varies. For instance, trust of partners will vary both within an
individual according to relationship type, between individuals’ in
terms of chronic tendencies to trust other people, and within one
individual’s speciﬁc relationship with another as that relationship
develops.)
The ways in which relational context vary are: (1) the type of
relationship; (2) the character (or “personality”) of the relation-
ship (as distinct from the personalities of individuals involved in
the relationship); (3) chronic individual differences in members’
orientations toward relationships; (4) the history of the relation-
ships; (5) the developmental stage of the relationships; and (6) the
broader relationship network within which a particular relation-
ship being studied is embedded (Clark et al., in press). In what
follows we provide a short description of each way of thinking
about relational context.
Relationship type
As noted above people (including many researchers) tend to think
of relationship types in lay terms. They talk about, for example,
their friendships, romantic relationships, parent–child relation-
ships, and work relationships. Yet relationship types have been
deﬁned differently within the social psychological literature that
deals speciﬁcally with studying and characterizing these different
types of interactions. Oneway relationships are commonly charac-
terized by relationship scientists is in terms of the norms, implicit
and explicit, that govern interactions with others in those relation-
ships (Clark andMills, 1979,1993,2012; Fiske, 1992). These norms
arise from the social function(s) people play in one another’s lives
(Bugental, 2000; Clark and Mills, 2012). Alternatively these can
be conceptualized as the goals that people pursue, ultimately or
proximately, in a given relationship.
In many cases, the goals that people pursue in given relation-
ships and the social functions that relationships serve in their lives
do differ along traditional lay-deﬁned relationship lines. Friend-
ship, for example, often serves the function of providing both
members with a sense of security based on each member follow-
ing an implicit rule to provide the other with non-contingent
support aimed at maintaining and promoting the other’s wel-
fare. A romantic relationship may serve this same function but,
importantly, it serves another function as well, providing for sex-
ual gratiﬁcation. So too does it serve the (ultimate) function of
preserving genes by helping people reproduce and to raise chil-
dren to the point of sexual maturity and reproduction themselves
(see Bugental, 2000). Thus, lay terms do capture some important
variance in relationship type, but lay language does not make
it clear just what is being captured, conceptually. If researchers
think more in terms of social functions of relationships and of
how those functions manifest themselves, they will be better off
scientiﬁcally.
For example, as just stated, people rely on some relationship
partners to be non-contingently responsive to their needs. These
relationships (known as communal relationships) provide peo-
ple with a sense of security and ﬂexibility in seeking as well as
giving support. Friendships, romantic relationships, and family
relationships often (but not always!) exemplify communal rela-
tionships. In other relationships people do not assume nor desire
such non-contingent responsiveness to needs and desires. Yet they
may still wish to seek and give support to partners in a different,
less committing may. Imagine that a person’s drains are clogged
and that person seeks a plumber’s assistance. In such a case the
person may wish to form what has been called an exchange rela-
tionship (Clark and Mills, 1979, 1993; Clark and Aragon, 2013) in
which that person can seek support and provide compensation. In
exchange relationships, individuals provide beneﬁts to each other
with the expectation that these actions will be repaid; the bene-
ﬁts are given contingently, and the individuals feel no particular
non-contingent and ongoing responsibility for each other’s wel-
fare, beyond that which they feel for any other person (Clark and
Mills, 1979; Mills and Clark, 1982).
The communal/exchange distinction, however, is just one con-
ceptualization of relational context among many that may prove
useful toneuroscientists. Other typologies capturingdistinct social
functions – ones that categorize relationships in terms of power
or authority differences, in terms of sexual orientation, in terms
of genetic relatedness, for example – will prove useful for dif-
ferent purposes. Our point is not to cover them all but just to
urge researchers to think more in conceptual terms about rela-
tionship types and less in lay language terms, and to use the extant
literature on relationships in so doing. Although there currently
is no one scientiﬁc typology of relationship types that will ade-
quately serve all research purposes (the research questions must
guide the selection or generation of useful conceptualizations), we
refer readers to Bugental (2000) for an example of a particularly
clearly laid out typology regarding the various social functions a
relationship may serve. She distinguishes relationships in terms
of those which serve to keep us safe, those that allow collective
acquisition and defense of resources and territories, those that
promote mating, those involving reciprocity to maximize joint
outcomes and those that allow us to optimize welfare by unequal
distribution of power. She also discusses what sorts of informa-
tion, neuro-hormonal regulators and social–emotional responses
are relevant to each, as well as issues of development relating
to each.
When thinking about relationship types, it is important to keep
in mind that for purposes of conducting empirical work they can
be captured both in terms of the distinct natures of existing, ongo-
ing relationships as some researchers have done (e.g.,Ortigue et al.,
2010) but also that enacted, expected, and/or desired relationship
types can effectively experimentallymanipulated [see, for instance,
Clark (1986) for a description of an experimental manipulation
that effectively varies whether participants desire a communal or
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exchange relationship with a target person or De Bruijn and von
Rhein (2012), Koban et al. (2010), andRadke et al. (2011) for other
examples of effective experimental manipulations of relation-
ship type]. Each approach has advantages and disadvantages. Use
of existing relationships captures naturally occurring differences
between relationships but often lacks control and leaves room for
alternative explanations of observations. Conducting true experi-
ments in which expected or desired relationship types are manip-
ulated provides for more control but likely will not be feasible for
studies of relationship types that take days, months, or years to
develop.
Regardless of what strategy is used, relationship type is
likely to account for a great deal of variability in how we
express and perceive emotions, how and when we give and
accept support and empathize with others, and in how we
interact with others in economic or strategic situations. Even
so, there is more to relational context beyond just these
distinctions.
Relational character
To truly capture relational context one must also account for what
amounts to the personality of a relationship, or relational character.
Just as there are many aspects of an individual’s personality, so too
are there many aspects of relational character that vary across, as
well as within, relational types.
Take, for instance, communal relationships,whichwedescribed
above. Clark and Mills (1979) identiﬁed communal relation-
ships as those relationships in which partners provide beneﬁts
non-contingently, in support of one another’s welfare. Within
this general category, however, relationships can vary in terms
of communal strength, or, in other words, in the degree to
which one assumes responsibility for the other’s welfare (Mills
and Clark, 1982; Mills et al., 2004; Clark and Mills, 2012). Com-
munal strength can be indexed by the effort, time, and cost one
is willing to expend, in the service of (non-contingently) pro-
moting the partner’s welfare. Communal strength also can be
indexed by the relative priority one assigns to caring for a spe-
ciﬁc partner when one has multiple, communal relationships, the
demands of which may conﬂict. This aspect of relationship char-
acter is central to determining the giving of support and feelings
of guilt and to determining levels of distress when support is not
given.
Communal strength, however, is just one of many aspects
of relational character to which neuroscientists might proﬁtably
attend in their studies of social and emotional phenomena.
Interdependence theorists, for instance, have discussed variation
between relationships in terms of the degree to which people’s
routines of thoughts, emotions and behaviors are dependent upon
those of their partner. They index that degree of interdependence
by how frequently, strongly, and in how many distinct ways mem-
bers of the relationship inﬂuence each other’s routines (Kelley,
1979; Berscheid et al., 1989). Other examples of relational charac-
ter include two persons’ similarity (along any of many possible
dimensions; Amodio and Showers, 2005), the trust that exists
between them (Simpson, 2007), the certainty that each person
has regarding the existence and nature of their relationship (Clark
et al., 1998), their commitment to remaining together (Rusbult,
1983), and the degree to which the partners are satisﬁed with
the relationship (Hendrick, 1988). These dimensions of relational
character overlap somewhat empirically as well as conceptually.
There are not right or wrong ways in which to characterize
relational character. What is important is to consider relational
character in conducting social neuroscience work and to consider
how it may shape whatever aspects of affect, cognition, and/or
behavior are being studied.
As with relationship types, it is important for researchers to
keep in mind that relational character can be measured and that
it also can be effectively manipulated in many cases. We refer
readers to Lamm et al. (2009) for a neuroscientiﬁc study in which
the similarity of participants’ pain experiences to those of a tar-
get person was effectively varied (and in which similarity did
have signiﬁcant effects on participants’ empathic reactions to
targets).
Individual differences in approaches to relationships
The third aspect of relational context is the chronic nature of
individuals’ orientation toward their relationships in general. Peo-
ple are known to vary in prosocial orientation (e.g., Batson
and Shaw, 1991; Grant and Mayer, 2009), in chronic levels of
relationship insecurity captured by anxious and avoidant attach-
ment styles (Mikulincer and Shaver, 2007), in rejection sensitivity
(Downey and Feldman, 1996), in empathic self-efﬁcacy beliefs
(Alessandri et al., 2009), in communal orientation (Clark et al.,
1987), in self-esteem (Leary and Downs, 1995) and the list
could continue. These individual differences (many of which
are interrelated though, to date, no one has documented fully
the extent to which they overlap and/or are independent of one
another) manifest themselves in the ways people relate to more
than one relationship, perhaps to all social relationships or to
all social relationships within a category of relationship types.
These individual differences also may interact with situational
factors, including relationship types, to determine attention to
others’ feelings, needs and desires, and reactions to receiving
support.
Individual differences also may inﬂuence a person’s ability to
effectively form and carry out the functions of any given rela-
tionship type. For instance, a person characterized by avoidant
attachmentmay have difﬁculty forming and carrying out the func-
tions of a communal relationship (see Simpson et al., 1992 for a
particularly clear and compelling illustration of this point). This
highlights another reason for researchers to be cautious regard-
ing using lay language terms to characterize relationship types. All
people may say they have friends, for instance. Yet not all relation-
ships called friendships will be characterized by members feeling
secure in partner responsiveness and being able to effectively give
and receive responsiveness. In other words, not all relationships
called friendships can be assumed to be the same conceptually.
The very nature of “friendships” will almost certainly differ with
the individual differences that people bring with them to those
relationships (see Clark and Lemay, 2010 for a full description of
this).
These individual differences constitute a part of what we
mean by relational context, and constitute a distinct way of
considering relational context both from relationship type and
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from the relational character of speciﬁc relationships. Still, in
many cases, the individual differences that people bring to rela-
tionships will blend and interact with relationship type and
relationship character to predict psychological reactions and
processes1.
Relationship histories and anticipated relationship futures
Existing relationships also have histories that must be taken into
account. A relationship’s history plays a role in shaping both part-
ners’ behavior, their perceptions of events, and their reactions
to those events. History with a partner creates expectations, and
these expectations inﬂuence how one behaves toward a partner
(Baldwin, 1992). An established pattern of interdependence with
a partner, for instance, leads to ﬁrm expectations for future behav-
ior, and can set the stage for feelings of emotions (both positive
and negative) when those expectations are broken (Berscheid and
Ammazzalorso, 2001).
Relationship history with one partner can also inﬂuence
thoughts, feelings, and behavior in a different relationship (Coan
et al., 2013a), especially if a current partner reminds a person
in some way of a past partner (Chen et al., 2013). Relationship
histories that inﬂuence new relationships more generally may
sometimes be best conceptualized as individual differences in
approaches to relationships (our category #3 here).
The anticipated future of a relationship also can shape social
desires, emotional judgments, and behavior in the present (cf.
Clark andMills, 1979). Receiving a gift from someone with whom
one anticipates forming a friendship or romantic relationship, for
example, will elicit a different response than receiving the same
gift from someone whom, one is certain, one will not be seeing
again in the future.
Developmental stage of relationships
The developmental stage of a relationship alsomay have important
consequences when it comes to social behavior2. Relationships
have a time course that interacts with their functions and goals. All
relationships change over time (Mitnick et al., 2009). Friendships
or business relationships between peers, for example, will have
establishment, maintenance, and – perhaps – deterioration stages.
Another (overlapping) way of thinking about relationship stages is
in termsof there being a deliberative stage of a relationship (involv-
ing deciding whether one wishes to be in the relationship andwhat
type of relationship one desires) and an implemental stage (involv-
ing implementing the appropriate behaviors within an established
relationship type; cf. Gollwitzer et al., 1990; Gagne and Lydon,
2001a,b). The stage of a relationship is an important predictor of
the social and emotional processes that will occur in that relation-
ship (Gagne and Lydon, 2001a,b; Beck and Clark, 2010; Clark and
Beck, 2011). Social and affective reactions to others change across
time as relationships unfold.
1Social neuroscientists more frequently have taken this aspect of relational context
into account than other aspects of relational context (see, for instance, Coan, 2008;
Vrticka et al., 2012), but attending to this one aspect of relational context cannot
completely substitute for attending to the other aspects as well.
2There is overlap in the history of a relationship and the developmental stage of a
relationship, of course. Still, there is value in considering them separately.
Placement of a relationship within wider relationship networks
The last aspect of relational context worthy of mention concerns
the placement of a particular relationship within each person’s
larger set of relationships – i.e., in their social network. Just as
individual interpersonal interactions occur within the context of
speciﬁc relationships, so too do relationships function within the
context of a person’s larger social network, and this also will inﬂu-
ence social and emotional behavior. For instance, attention to,
and favorable judgments of, the physical attractiveness of potential
romantic relationship partners have been shown to be decreased
by the existence of, and commitment to, an existing romantic
relationship partner (Johnson and Rusbult, 1989) and this moder-
ation is manifest even in very fast, automatic, and non-conscious
processes (Maner et al., 2008). A familiar face should bemore com-
forting when spotted in the context of many unfamiliar faces in
a new social situation (in which people tend to be anxious) than
when seen in the context ofmanyother familiar faces in established
social situations in which people are happy and comfortable (cf.
Vanbeselaere, 1980; Mikulincer et al., 2002; DeVries et al., 2010). A
person who is perfectly comfortable with a friend when they are
alone as a pair may be embarrassed by being associated with that
same friend when in the company of additional peers (cf. Fortune
and Newby-Clark, 2008).
In sum, relational context is complex. It includes relationship
type, relationship character, individual differences in orientations
toward relationships, relational history and stage, and the place-
ment of a given relationship in the wider context of a person’s
other relationships. No matter what a researcher’s substantive
interests, we believe it will be useful for that researcher to con-
sider all these aspects of relational context. A person interested in
empathy as a process, for instance, may wish to consider varia-
tion in empathic processes between types of relationships, within
types of relationships, at different points in a relationship’s his-
tory and stage as well as how empathy is inﬂuenced by the wider
social network into which a relationship ﬁts. We have little doubt
that an explicit consideration of conceptual variables as they are
captured in each type of relational context will prove to be use-
ful and, when taken into account in planning and conducting
research, will make it easier to integrate ﬁndings, both within neu-
roscience, and across neuroscience and relationship science more
broadly.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSIDERING SOCIAL
NEUROSCIENCE FINDINGS IN RELATIONAL CONTEXT
Here we have already argued that (1) all social behavior takes
place, by deﬁnition, within the context of relationships, and that
(2) relational context often affects the nature of results obtained
in neuroscientiﬁc and other studies of psychological processes.
In order to illustrate these points, we have chosen to discuss, as
examples, a few speciﬁc types of neuroscience research on a few
measures of social behavior. First, we examine relational context
and the expression and perception of emotion. Next we look at
the impact it has on empathy, and then we consider the impact it
has on the giving and receiving of social support. Finally, we will
brieﬂy comment on how relational context inﬂuences even some
seemingly non-social thoughts, feelings and behaviors. In each
case, the point we will make is simple: relational context matters.
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Speciﬁcally, we suggest that: (a) much neuroscientiﬁc research has
ignored relational context; (b) the largely separate behavioral liter-
ature in this area provides strong evidence that relational context
matters; and (c) those neuroscience studies that have taken rela-
tional context into account generally show that relational context
does matter.
PERCEIVING AND REACTING TO OTHERS’ EMOTIONS
There is now a large literature on the neural correlates of emo-
tion perception. Within this literature, there is growing variation
in the paradigms used (see discussions in, for example, Barrett,
2006; Scherer et al., 2011). Of particular importance is the fact
that, in the vast majority of cases, the stimuli utilized in emo-
tion perception paradigms have been depictions of people who
are strangers to the participants (see Ebner et al., 2012; Montoya
et al., 2012 for some recent examples but many more exist). More-
over often these are strangers whom participants actually are not
meeting and whom they never expect to see again. This is the
case in studies of reactions to facial (e.g., Xaoyun et al., 2009),
vocal (e.g., Baum and Nowicki, 1998), and bodily (e.g., Coulson,
2004) expressions of emotion, and in cross-cultural (e.g., Yik et al.,
1998), developmental (e.g., Camras et al., 2002), and clinical (e.g.,
Anderson and Phelps, 2000) research as well. This is troubling,
because the broader psychological literature on relationships (as
well as a growing amount of the neuroscience literature) provides
good reason to believe that relational context has a major impact
on how people perceive and react to others’ emotions.
Perceiving emotion: some ﬁndings that may not extend beyond
perceiving emotions in strangers whom one will never see again
When people encounter strangers, the primary function that
emotion perception may serve is to protect or promote the
self ’s well-being by, say, avoiding angry people, approaching
smiling people, and looking around to detect problems and
to protect the self when someone else seems fearful (Klin-
nert et al., 1986). However, the functions that others’ emotional
expressions serve become more complex when relational context
is considered.Whenpeople knowone another,when they are inter-
dependent, and when they assume responsibility for one another’s
welfare, others’ facial expressions continue to be signals that can
be used to protect or promote the self, but they take on additional
functions as well – one important one being that they serve as
signals of the other person’s welfare and, as such, as signs that the
perceiver should provide care to the other person. If a person is
fearful perhaps one might reassure the other person, help the per-
son distance himor herself from the feared stimulus, or remove the
feared stimulus from the environment. If a person is happy, one
might ask why and celebrate with the person, thereby prolonging
the person’s happiness, leave the person alone to continue enjoy-
ing whatever is causing the happiness, or repeat one’s own actions
if they were the source of the happiness as is appropriate to the
situation.
For example, consider the implications of taking account of
whether there is an existing caring (or communal) relationship –
or the desire to establish a relationship – between a perceiver and
an emotional target person for interpreting one recent study of
reactions to others’ facial expressions. N’Diaye et al. (2009) had
24 individuals look at target faces expressing happiness, fear, or
anger, in either mild or intense forms. They also varied the direc-
tion in which the target face was gazing, such that the person
was either looking directly at the perceiver, or off to the side.
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scans were col-
lected. The researchers predicted that, for the faces expressing fear,
the perceived self-relevance of the expression would be higher
when the gaze was averted (which suggests that there is some-
thing in the environment for the self to fear) rather than when
it was direct (suggesting that the person feared the participant),
but that, for faces expressing anger, the perceived self-relevance
would be greater when the target face was looking directly at the
participant (which suggests that the emotional target is angry at
the perceiver) than when it was averted. These predictions were
supported. Behaviorally, ratings of emotion intensity were greater
when fear was expressed with an averted gaze than with a direct
gaze, and when anger was expressed with a direct gaze than with
an averted gaze. The same pattern was reﬂected in terms of the
neural correlates of emotion perception, in the amygdala, as well
as in the fusiform and medial prefrontal cortices.
These results are intriguing, and the explanations makes good
sense given that the target persons were strangers to the partic-
ipants, which, in this study, they were. We watch out for and
protect ourselves when with strangers. However, what if the target
person had been a friend, a romantic partner, or a family member?
What if he or she were simply someone attractive, with whom a
participant desired a relationship? Then, viewers’ reactions to the
emotions expressed, and the interaction effect with gaze direction
that has been observed, we suggest, almost certainly would have
been different.
Importantly, those who willingly express emotions to us are
choosing to convey rather than to suppress information about their
own well being (Clark et al., 2001). They are often in need of our
support and, if we have assumed responsibility for their welfare (or
wish to do so going forward), people often switch their relational
focus of attention from themselves and the implications of others
for themselves to the partner andwhat they can do for that partner
(Clark et al., 2008). Perceivers then respond to others’ negative
emotions with care (Clark et al., 1987; Graham et al., 2008). To
give an obvious example, parents typically respond to an infant’s
cries by shifting attention to the child, focusing on the child’s needs
and providing care. Spouses and friends would likely do the same.
When a fearful face looking right at us belongs to a person for
whomwehave assumedorwould like to assume responsibility, that
should trigger a shift in relational focus of attention (Clark et al.,
2008) from the self to the other person. The face then becomes
an implicit request for help, especially in the direct gaze condition.
Our reactions ought to be just as intense (or perhapsmore intense),
and likely different in nature both from those captured when look-
ing at a fearful stranger, and from those captured when the person
is gazing somewhere else (then, just as in the original study, we
may react on our behalf as well as on their behalf). And what
about angry gazes? In an intimate relationship in which another’s
emotion signals us that our partner has a need to which we should
attend, an angry person’s averted gaze may be interpreted as a call
for help from us. In the context of a communal relationship, an
angry averted gaze may elicit just as much of a reaction from us
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as does an angry direct gaze and, importantly, a distinct kind of
reaction. We may wish to come to the aid of the person with an
angry diverted gaze; we may still wish to protect ourselves when
we perceived an angry direct gaze (suggesting our partner is mad
at us) but when we care for the other’s welfare that reactionmay be
mixed with some feeling of responsibility for the other (especially
if we did cause the anger and are in a secure, well-functioning
communal relationship; cf. Yoo et al., 2011).
Perceiving and reacting to emotion (or events likely to have elicited
emotion): data showing relational context does matter
A case for routinely taking relational context into account in
interpreting studies of reactions to others’ emotional faces, and
in planning for new studies also can be made on the basis
results of existing neuroscience studies, that already have incorpo-
rated facets of relational context into their designs. For instance,
although some have suggested that responses to self-related
emotion do not overlap a great deal with responses to oth-
ers’ emotion (e.g., Jackson et al., 2006), a recent study reported
by Beckes et al. (2012) found that whereas threats directed at
strangers produced neural responses quite distinct from those
directed at the self; threats directed at friends produced neu-
ral responses that overlapped far more with those produced by
threats directed at the self. Relationship type mattered. As Aron
et al. (1991) have shown using behavioral measures, when we
care about close others we often “include the other in the self”
cognitively.
Work by Barrett et al. (2012) and Singer et al. (2006) also is
instructive in terms of the import of relational context. Barrett
et al. (2012) used fMRI to examine the effects of infant facial
expressions (both positive and negative) on adults. In conduct-
ing this research they considered three of the six dimensions of
relational context highlighted earlier in this article: relationship
type was varied experimentally (i.e., participants viewed their own
infant or someone else’s infant who was unknown to them), and
aspects of relationship history (in this case participants’ history
of mood and anxiety during their own postpartum period while
relating to their child) as well as the participant’s own orientation
toward close relationships (in this case attachment styles) were
measured.
Both relationship type and participants’ histories of relation-
ships with their own infant inﬂuenced neural reactions to pictures
of infants. Regarding relationship type, participants showed
greater BOLD responses in the postcentral gyrus, subgenual ante-
rior cingulate gyrus, ventral putamen, and superior temporal
gyrus in response to their own infant’s negative expression than in
response to an unknown infant’s negative expression.
More interesting is another ﬁnding the authors reported. It was
that that poorer postpartum quality of the participants’ mater-
nal experience (a variable that picks up both relational history
and, likely, chronic individual differences in participants’ orienta-
tion toward the relationships with their children) was signiﬁcantly
related to reduced amygdala response to participants’ own infants’
positive facial expressions relative to participants’ reactions an
unknown infant’s positive expressions. This is a fascinating result.
Perhaps all mothers, depressed and anxious or not, simply must
attend to distressed infants but a history of stress, depressedmoods
and anxiety during thepostpartumperiod selectively reduces some
mothers’ tendencies to see their own child’s positive emotional
expressions as signiﬁcant. That is an important because other
research suggests a child’s happiness is an important signal to care-
takers (Clark and Monin, 2014), and that happiness does capture
most people’s attention (Becker et al., 2011) and holds it (Power
et al., 1982). Positive expressions suggest that a child is enjoy-
ing whatever is going on, thereby conveying information about
what activities, foods and people a child enjoys and should be
repeated or made use of when a child is not happy. The work
reported by Barrett et al. (2012) suggests that all these functions
of a child expressing happiness may be jeopardized among those
with a history of postpartum depression, stress and anxiety. These
speciﬁc results are interesting. For the present purposes, however,
the overarching lesson remains that the meaning of facial expres-
sions and neural responses to them are qualiﬁed by relational
context.
Consider also the implications of the Barrett et al. (2012) ﬁnd-
ings for interpreting the results another recent study reported
by Montoya et al. (2012). Montoya et al. (2012) collected neural
scans that suggested that adults (in this case non-parents) experi-
ence happy infant faces as rewarding. Perhaps we are just generally
built to ﬁnd such faces rewarding but Barrett et al.’s (2012) results
show us that in the situation in which such responses are surely
most important (reacting to our own happy infant) that a poor
relational history may cause this to go awry.
Research by Singer et al. (2006) also demonstrates that rela-
tional context matters to people’s perceptions of others’ emotional
states. These researchers were interested in how research partici-
pants would react to watching a confederate in a laboratory who
is experiencing pain and presumably distress. Others have exam-
ined this as well but Singer et al. (2006) added a twist to the study
by experimentally varying relational history. Speciﬁcally, prior to
viewing the confederate experiencing pain the experimenter ran-
domly assigned half the participants to be treated fairly by the
confederate in an economic game and half to be treated unfairly.
That manipulated relationship history made a difference. Both
male and female participants exhibited empathy-related activa-
tion in pain-related areas (fronto-insular and anterior cingulate
cortices) when seeing previously fair players experience pain.
However, when viewing the unfair confederate in pain and, pre-
sumably, distress, these responses were signiﬁcantly lower among
the male (but not the female) participants. Not only that, these
males also showed increased activation in reward related areas
when seeing the previously unfair confederate in pain and this acti-
vation correlated with thesemale participants’ expressed desire for
revenge. Relationshiphistory – in this case, very recent relationship
history – mattered a lot for these males.
Also worthy of note is a study by Vrticka et al. (2009). It too
demonstrates that relational history can be manipulated and that
people’s histories of interactions with others can inﬂuence how
they perceive faces going forward. These researchers manipulated
people’s exposure to smilingor angry faces in the context of a game.
Later they exposed the same people to these faces (now with neu-
tral expressions) along with other neutral faces while using fMRI
to record responses. As one might now expect, relational history
made a difference. The results revealed that regions involved in
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recognizing familiar faces – the fusiform cortex, posterior cingu-
late gyrus, and amygdala, as well as motivational control areas
such as the caudate and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), were dif-
ferentially modulated as a function of whether prior encounters
with the face had been in a friendly versus unfriendly context.
These results illustrate the impact of relational history well, and
also show that it can be effectively experimentally manipulated.
Perhaps the most frequent way that relational context has been
taken into account in this area of neuroscience research is by mea-
suring individual differences in orientations to relationships in
studies, and the most commonly examined individual differences
are attachment styles. In this regard, we would simply note that
when these measures have been added to several studies of reac-
tions to others’ facial expressions, they have been shown to make a
difference in the neural activity observed (see Vrticka et al., 2008;
Suslow et al., 2009 for a few examples).
GIVING SOCIAL SUPPORT
Psychologists – particularly social psychologists, but also soci-
ologists, anthropologists, developmental psychologists, and
economists – have long studied helping and other forms of
what is commonly called prosocial behavior (Dovidio et al., 2006;
Schroeder andGraziano, in press). More recently, a large neurosci-
entiﬁc literature has emerged on this topic. There are, for instance,
studies using fMRI that have focused on identifying the neural
correlates of reactions to signs of others’ needs (e.g., reactions to a
picture of a sad other for instance; Kim et al., 2009). There also has
been research aimed at eliciting actual prosocial behavior, so as to
identify the conditions under which is it likely (and unlikely) to
occur (e.g., Kosfeld et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2007; Izuma et al., 2010).
As is the case for many studies of reactions to others’ emotions,
the neuroscientiﬁc measures in much of this work (including all
studies cited in the paragraph above) also have involved the col-
lection of people’s reactions to strangers whom participants have
never seen before and likely never expect to see again. Further, it
is quite common for researchers to select their stimuli from one
of just a few standardized sets of stimuli and these stimuli often
depict stereotypical expressions that may not adequately capture
the nature of facial expressions that occur in normal, everyday,
social interactions3.
Indirect evidence that relational context matters
Weknow from a now large behavioral research literature, that rela-
tional context plays a huge role in the degree to which we respond
(or fail to respond to) other people’s needs as well as in how we
respond to others’ needs (Clark and Aragon, 2013). We also know
that relational context matters in terms of what elicits respon-
siveness, in the nature of responses that are elicited, and in how
people act, after having provided support to another person (see
Clark andAragon, 2013 a review). People givemore support to kin
than to non-kin (Segal, 1984; Essock-Vitale and McGuire, 1985;
Borgida et al., 1992; Burnstein, 2005), especially when support is
3We certainly recognize the value of standardizing stimuli within studies for pur-
poses of experimental control and across studies for purposes of being able to
compare results. Our point is simply that results from studies utilizing only
strangers as stimuli and only stereotypical expressions run the risk of not being
very generalizable.
needed in life-threatening situations (Burnstein et al., 1994). They
also give more support to those with whom they desire an ongo-
ing relationship than to others (Clark et al., 1987). Motivations for
giving support also vary – sometimes liking drives support giving;
sometimes duty does so. Evolutionarily determined forces seem
to drive some support giving; desire to establish business-like ties
drives other forms of support giving (see Clark et al., in press).
Relationship stage matters as well. We tend to give more support
than we ask for as we strive to form desired relationships. In estab-
lished relationships giving and seeking support tends to even out
(Beck and Clark, 2009). This suggests that very early on in volun-
tary relationships – e.g., in friendships – help is, perhaps, given for
selﬁsh, strategic reasons; later on, it may be motivated primarily
on the basis of partner need. The consequences of support giv-
ing also vary considerably. Sometimes we feel good about having
helped (when it promotes relationships that are desired); some-
times we regret or feel gullible for having helped for instance when
we help someone who is not special to us in any way (Williamson
and Clark, 1989, 1992).
Individual differences in relationship orientations between
people also matter a great deal. A striking example of this comes
from research reported by Simpson et al. (1992). These scholars
found that a person’s response to a close other’s needs depended
on that person’s own attachment style. Those who were low in
avoidance reacted to partner anxiety as one might expect and as is
socially functional. That is, the more anxious their partners were,
the more support they offered. However, those high in avoidance
reacted in an entirely different manner. The more anxious their
partners, the less support they provided.
All this means that, in interpreting neural correlates of giving
support we should carefully consider inwhat relational context the
data have been collected and, consequently, what their limitations
might be. It also recommends intentionally including relational
context in the design of neuroscience studies.
Direct evidence that relational context matters
Indeed, when neuroscience research has included relational con-
text in designs, it typically matters. Consider some results recently
reported by Telzer et al. (2011). These researchers scanned peo-
ple’s brains while the people were choosing to give or not to
give monetary rewards to family members. They found that
decisions to give family members money were linked with acti-
vation in areas of the brain associated with self-control and
mentalizing. More importantly for our point they also found
that quality of the family relationships, or, in the terms we used
earlier in this article, the relational character of the family rela-
tionships, mattered. Individuals who felt greater obligation to
family members also showed greater functional coupling between
regions related to self-control and those related to mentalizing
within the ventral striatum, an area that, the authors report, is
involved in reward processing. This suggests that it may well be
effortful to support family members but that so doing is also
rewarding for those who feel strong obligations to those family
members.
For the present purposes the details of studies such as those
reported by Telzer et al. (2011) and other studies in which rela-
tional context has been incorporated as a variable (see, for instance,
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Kim et al., 2011; Musser et al., 2012; Seifritz et al., 2013) are less
important than are the overarching lessons taught by this research.
Variations in relational context often will be associated with varia-
tions in the patterning of neural responses to partner needs and to
actual responsiveness to partners. Moreover, only by combining
knowledge about support giving, relational context and neutral
responses may we come to understand just what neural responses
to partner distress really mean.
Consider also lessons learned about the importance of rela-
tional context from studies on the neuropeptide oxytocin. Studies
to date on the effects of experimentally varying intranasal expo-
sure to oxytocin provide one of the most striking examples of
the importance of taking relational context into account in neu-
roscientiﬁc studies of support giving. Early work on exposure to
oxytocin and prosocial behavior involved the administration of
oxytocin (or not) to individualswhowere strangers to one another.
Intriguing and dramatic effects emerged. One study utilized the
now common ultimatum game paradigm in which one person is
given money and then offers to split it any way he or she chooses
between the self and the partner. Then the partner chooses to
accept the split – in which case each person gets what was offered
– or to refuse it, in which case each person gets nothing. In this
study, participants who had been administered oxytocin intra-
nasally made more generous proposals to “partners” (strangers)
than did those who had not been exposed to oxytocin (Kosfeld
et al., 2005; Zak et al., 2007). Some follow-up studies yielded sim-
ilar effects (e.g., Israel et al., 2012). The initial study appeared in
a prominent journal and received much media attention. Indeed,
one author gave a widely shared TED talk (Zak, 2011) in which
he declared oxytocin to be the “love hormone” and then wrote a
popular book advocating a similar view (Zak, 2012). Subsequent
papers urging therapeutic usage of oxytocin quickly appeared (cf.
Striepens et al., 2011). Although many researchers were cautious
in claimsmade, as just noted other researchers andmanymembers
of the media were not.
The problem was (and is) that if one-steps back and consid-
ers the literature more broadly, oxytocin does not always increase
prosocial behavior. Indeed, not infrequently, it decreases proso-
cial behavior (Radke and de Bruijn, 2012 and see Bartz et al., 2011
for a review of literature on this topic). About 20% of the time
intranasal administration of oxytocin actually seems to promote
antisocial behavior (Bartz et al., 2011).
What predicts when oxytocin increases prosocial behavior and
when it does not? TheBartz et al.’s (2011) reviewmakes it clear that
relational context is key. Intra-nasal administration of oxytocin
seems to promote trust in and prosocial behavior toward benign
strangers (Kosfeld et al., 2005) and toward liked others generally
but not to outgroupmembers (DeDreu et al., 2011) or people sus-
pected of being outgroup members (Radke and de Bruijn, 2012)
or, necessarily, amongpeople generally low in trust of others (Bartz
et al., 2011). In other words, relational context (in this literature
captured by variation in relationship types and by individual dif-
ferences in people’s orientations toward relationships) can ﬂip the
effects of oxytocin on participants’ behavior changing them from
pro- to anti-social in nature.
Genes also relate to variability in who does and does not
respond to oxytocinwith increased prosocial behavior (e.g., Poulin
et al., 2012). A nucleotide polymorphism involving a guanine (G)
to adenine (A) substitution is linked to sensitivity to relationship
context. People homozygous for the G allele (or, sometimes, hav-
ing at least one copy of the G allele) seem to beneﬁt more from
partners’ positive emotions and caring for them than those lacking
G alleles (cf. Bakermans-Kranenburg and Van Ijzendoorn, 2008;
Rodrigues et al., 2009) and also to be harmed more by a negative
social context (e.g., abuse by others in early childhood (cf. Bradley
et al., 2011) than those lacking G alleles. Althoughmore research is
needed, again, relational context, this time in the form of the rela-
tional character/relational histories in interaction with individual
differences (here in genes), seem to matter a lot.
Importantly evidence that relational context makes a difference
to the effects of oxytocin on social behavior spurred theorists to
move away from declarations that oxytocin increases trust in and
generosity toward others per se, toward more carefully considered
explanations of just what the function and effects of oxytocin are.
Perhaps, researchers now suggest, oxytocin increases the salience of
social stimuli resulting in more positive reactions to safe, trusted,
liked, or smiling people and more negative reactions to distrusted,
disliked, or angry people (Rimmele et al., 2009; Sharnay-Tsoory
et al., 2009). Alternatively, perhaps oxytocin increases approach
tendencies (in both positive and negative ways) and damps down
avoidant tendencies (Kemp and Guastella, 2011). No matter what
the explanation turns out to be, it was the variability of results
across relational contexts that forced theorists in this area to think
about the oxytocin in a more nuanced way and that has already
(and will continue) to result in better theory.
Once again, we would say: to understand neural correlates
of prosocial behavior one must consider relational context. To
build a good science of prosocial responding researchers must also
combine the now large and rapidly expanding behavioral ﬁnd-
ings in this ﬁeld by social psychologists, health psychologists, and
developmentalists that takes relational context into account with
neuroscience studies that also take relational context into account.
It is happening to some extent in the literature; it needs to happen
more and in more sophisticated ways.
RECEIVING SOCIAL SUPPORT
People not only behave prosocially toward others; they receive
support or are the target of other prosocial acts from others most
typically, in daily life, in the context of friendships, romantic rela-
tionships, and family relationships. As with the topics we have
covered already, reactions to receiving various forms of proso-
cial behavior have begun to be studied by neuroscientists, often
outside the context of ongoing relationships. Examples include
two recent studies, one on the impact of receiving an apology
(Strang et al., 2012) and another on the impact of receiving sup-
portive text messages after having suffered exclusion (Onoda et al.,
2009). Occasionally relational context has been taken into account
in such work (see Coan et al., 2006 for an example of a study in
which relational context was taken into account).
Can we generalize the results of studies of neural responses to
support received from strangers to what is likely to happen when
support is received fromwell known others?We suspect not. Con-
sider Onoda et al.’s (2009) study of having received supportive text
messages from a stranger after having been rejected by a different
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groupof strangers. These authors adopted amanipulationof social
exclusion used bymany previous researchers (Williams and Jarvis,
2006). That is, participants played a game of cyberball with two
other players. They were included in the ball tosses at ﬁrst. Later
they were excluded. The exclusion elicited activity in the ACC as
has been found in other studies. Later they received emotionally
supportive text messages. Those whose reported social pain was
reduced also showed lowered ventral ACC activation and height-
ened left lateral prefrontal cortex activation. The authors suggest
that for these people social support enhanced prefrontal cortex
activity, which, in turn, dampened activity within the ventral ACC.
But when and for whom will rejection be most and least painful?
When and for whom will supportive messages be most and least
helpful? The answers certainly depend in important ways upon
relational context. Thus, can we safely generalize results such as
those of Williams and Jarvis (2006)? Probably not.
One neuroscience study of support already provides proof that
relational context can shape neural responses to receiving support
(Coan et al., 2006 and see also Coan et al., 2013b for a follow-up
on the original study). In these researchers’ experiment, married
women were told that they were in a study involving receiving
shocks. On some trials they would be safe from shocks on other
trials they might receive them. This occurred while participants
were in an fMRI scanner. The experimenters varied whether the
women received support in the form of handholding or not. Rela-
tional context also was varied in two ways. First relationship type
was varied. Sometimes participants held a stranger’s hand, some-
times they held their husband’s hand, and sometimes they held
no one’s hand. In addition the relational character of participants’
marriages was measured prior to the scanning session. In par-
ticular the women ﬁlled out measures of marital quality tapping
satisfaction cohesion, consensus, and affection in their marriages.
Both relationship type and relational character moderated the
women’s neural responses to the prosocial behavior of someone
holding their hand while they were under stress. Activation in
the neural systems known to underlie emotional and behavioral
threat responses was most attenuated when the women held their
husbands’ hands. A similar but less attenuated neural response
was observed when they held the hand of a stranger compared to
holding no one’s hand. In addition, among those whose husbands
held their hand, the higher the quality of the woman’s marriage to
her husband the less these neural areas were activated.
The behavioral literature on reactions to receiving support is
long standing and ﬁts well with Coan et al. (2006) and Coan et al.
(2013b) ﬁndings. Beyond that it clearly shows that it is not just
relationship type and quality that matter to people’s reactions to
receiving support. People welcome non-contingent social support
when they are open to a close relationship with the support giver
but prefer contingent support when we prefer a more formal busi-
ness like relationship (Clark andMills, 1979). In addition, if people
are secure, they seek support when it is needed; but if they are
avoidantly attached they retreat when they most need the support
(Simpson et al., 1992). If they are secure they perceive support
as having been given voluntarily; if they are avoidant, they seem
biased to see support received as having been involuntarily given
(Clark and Beck, 2011). If they want to be responsive to another
they are more likely to see others as more responsive (holding
objective responsiveness constant) than if they do not have that
desire (Lemay et al., 2007; Lemay and Clark, 2008) and the list
could go on.
RELATIONAL CONTEXT IS LIKELY TO PROVE IMPORTANT IN
MANY ADDITIONAL DOMAINS
In this paper, we have chosen to emphasize the importance of
taking relational context into account by focusing on research
in the topical areas of perceiving and reacting to others’ emo-
tions, giving social support, and receiving social support. These
are among the most obvious substantive research areas for which
relational context should matter. Yet it is important to note that
the extant behavioral literature reveals that relational context can
inﬂuence many, many types of thoughts, feelings, and behaviors,
even ones that do not seem very social at all. Consider perceptions
of the nature of one’s physical environment, for instance. Schnall
et al. (2008) conducted two studies in which relational context was
found to inﬂuence how steep perceivers judged a hill to be. In a
ﬁrst study people who judged the steepness of a hill when with a
friend judged the hill to be less steep than people asked to judge the
same hill in the absence of a friend. In a second study participants
were assigned to think about a supportive friend, a neutral person
or a disliked person and then to judge the steepness of a hill. The
hill was judged to be less steep after thinking about a friend than
after thinking about a neutral or disliked other. Here relational
context as indexed by relationship type mattered.
Alternatively, consider ability to perform a non-social task.
Woolley et al. (2010) asked groups of people to solve tasks. The
average individual IQ of group members and the highest IQ of
any group member positively predicted performance, but weakly.
However two relational context measures were substantially bet-
ter positive predictors: the group members’ ability to read one
another’s emotions [as indexed by Baron-Cohen et al.’s (2001)
“reading the mind in the eyes” task and how evenly distributed
participation in the task was (as indexed by the group members’
turn-taking)]4. Here relational context as captured by individual
differences in relational skills (in reading themind in the eyes) and
the relational character of groups (how evenly they shared tasks)
inﬂuenced the groups’ problem solving abilities.
The point of this brief section is simple. Relational context
may inﬂuence outcomes (including outcomes assessed by neuro-
scientists) in many, many types of tasks including ones that may
not appear to be social in nature. Thus, whereas taking relational
context into account in neuroscience studies that are very clearly
social in nature may be especially important, so too may taking it
into account more broadly in neuroscience (and in other types of
research as well) prove fruitful.
CONCLUSION
The overall points of this paper are simple: by deﬁnition social
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors involve other people. All social
thoughts, feelings, and behaviors occur within the context of a
relationship with another person (even if the relationship is one
between strangers interacting with one another for the ﬁrst time
who never expect to see one another again.) Much behavioral
4Performance also was better when more females participated.
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social, developmental and clinical work and a growing body con-
temporary social neuroscience research provide evidence that the
relational context within which people interact (together and in
interactionwith other variables) is a powerful factorwhen it comes
to shaping social feelings, thoughts, and behaviors. Yet many neu-
roscientists (and many other types of researchers alike, including,
somewhat surprisingly, social psychologists) still study humans
in isolation or, at best, when they are interacting with strangers.
Often the “other people” are simply pictures of strangers. Even
when people are studied while actively interacting with others and
even when those others are in an ongoing relationship with the
participant, often the nature of the relational context is not var-
ied within the study nor are results of studies conducted in such
relational contexts compared across studies inwhich the same pro-
cesses were observed in other relational contexts with the explicit
goal of considering how relational context may have shaped the
results. It is not sufﬁcient simply to move toward studying effects
in richer more naturalistic contexts. Relational context must be
considered a variable that may (and often does) shape people’s
cognitions, emotions and behaviors.
If researchers are to build a coherent body of scientiﬁc knowl-
edge about such things as empathy, support giving, support receipt
(and the list could go on to cover many other topics), they must
attend to relational context (including types of relationships, the
character of relationships, individual differences in orientation
toward relationships, histories and anticipated futures of relation-
ships, relationship stage andwhere relationships sit within broader
networks of other relationships). In so doing neuroscientists (and
others) would be well advised to utilize, build upon and contribute
to the now substantial relationship science literature. Researchers
who have produced that literature have developed theory and solid
empirical bodies of research characterizing these contexts in con-
ceptual terms (Clark and Lemay, 2010; Simpson and Campbell,
2013).
Taking this literature into account is necessary to build a solid,
generalizable, and integrated body of social neuroscience. In mak-
ing this point we should (and do) acknowledge that, before us and
continuing to the present, two other social psychologists, Ellen
Berscheid andHarry Reis have urged the entire ﬁeld of psychology
to take relationship context into account in establishing and in
integrating psychological knowledge (Berscheid and Reis, 1998;
Reis et al., 2000; Reis, 2006, 2010). They have used somewhat
different terms and arguments than we do here but, essentially
conveying the same message. Moreover, others such as Guroglu
et al. (2009) have called for studying neural correlates of social
behaviors in relational context (in their case they speciﬁcally urge
researchers to study these behaviors longitudinally across develop-
ment as individuals acquire crucial social decision making skills).
Still, this point is neglected sufﬁciently often that we feel it is well
worthwhile to note the still largely individualistic nature of psy-
chology studies generally (including neuroscientiﬁc studies) and
to call for greater consideration of relational context.
Most recently, as we were concluding preparation of this
manuscript for Frontiers, we read two other papers whose authors
join us in making a call for more attention to relational context in
research. First, Beckes and Coan (2013) published a review article
on social neuroscience ﬁndings relevant to relationships in The
Oxford Handbook on Close Relationships (Simpson and Campbell,
2013). Within this paper they too call for integrating knowledge
of relationships into social neuroscience. So too do Schilbach et al.
(2013) call for more neuroscience work done in social context5.
We are delighted to have company.We endorse several of Beckes
and Coan’s (2013) suggestions for future efforts in this regard,
namely that researchers should: (a) utilize relational context and,
in particular “move toward the measurement of a larger variety
of emotional and cognitive tasks in a relational context” because
“many processes may diverge from current ﬁndings once they are
tested in the presence of a loved one.” (Beckes and Coan, 2013,
p. 705), (b) realize that relationship processes unfold across time
and consider conducting longitudinal research, and (c) realize that
taking relational context into account will enhance the chances of
social neuroscience contributing to the development of clinical
interventions emerging from our work.
In concluding this paper, we would re-emphasize two addi-
tional points. Social neuroscientists and other researchers alike
should not be content to think of relational context just in terms
of relationship types identiﬁed in lay language terms (e.g., non-
parents vs. parents, or loved ones versus non-loved ones). Neither
will it be sufﬁcient to think of relational context in terms of
just one type of individual difference in people’s approaches to
relationships (e.g., attachment styles). We should be thinking of
relationship context in clearly laid out conceptual terms and con-
sideration should be given relational context in all its complexity
including not just relationship type but also relationship character,
relationship histories, relationship stages (this is why longitudi-
nal studies are needed), as well as the placement of particular
relationships in the context of other relationships.
Many of the conceptual variables that will prove central to our
research (for instance, the trust between two people) will vary
within relationships (as relational character), between relationship
types, between individualswith different relationship orientations,
with relational history and with the placement of relationships in
larger networks of relationships. Thinking of how any construct
in which a researcher is interested varies in each of these ways
will allow that researcher to design studies that test hypotheses
in different and more sophisticated ways and, in turn, to build a
better and more integrated sets of ﬁndings.
As stated at the start of this manuscript, if social neuroscien-
tists ignore relational context they risk establishing a body of social
neuroscience that is narrow, of limited generalizability, and con-
fusing. If relational context is taken into account as researchers
build a social neuroscience of relationships, they stand a better
chance of producing a coherent, integrated body of knowledge
that will be intrinsically and practically valuable.
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